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The Future of Empirical Legal
Scholarship: Where Might We Go
from Here?
Kathryn Zeiler
Introduction
For some time now, scholarly journals have been editing and publishing
empirical legal studies. This includes both peer-reviewed journals, in ﬁelds
such as law, economics, and psychology, and non-peer-reviewed, studentedited law journals. The number of empirical legal studies that show up in
the pages of journals has been on the rise as empirical methods improve and
researchers gain easy access to a growing number of data sets. This addition
to legal scholarship is welcome after decades of theory’s dominance. Prior to
the entrance of empirical work onto the scene, we were drowning in a sea
of predictions derived from unvalidated theories. Journals were ﬁlled with
guesses, and we blindly applied theory in policymaking, if at all, in the absence
of evidence that the relevant theoretical insights were accurate and robust. The
situation has improved in recent years as we have sought to verify theories
relevant to law and policy using data from a rapidly expanding number of
sources.
This is the good news. The troubling news is that empirical scholarship in
most ﬁelds is under ﬁre. Several studies published during the past decade have
revealed the tenuous nature of a shockingly high percentage of some of the
most widely cited empirical results. Empiricists are scrambling to ﬁnd eﬀective
ways to restore conﬁdence in published empirical studies. The situation in
the ﬁeld of law is doubly worse. First, the average quality of empirical
studies published in student-edited law reviews is undoubtedly lower than
those published in peer-reviewed journals. This is partly because law review
editorial boards, usually comprising solely law students, do not systematically
require expert review of submitted work. Student editors are eager to publish
empirical work, but too often lack the expertise to ensure that they publish
only high-quality, replicable studies. This system encourages submissions by
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authors who are interested in testing theory but lack suﬃcient expertise in
empirical methods. As a result, empirical studies published in law reviews
are often plagued by basic problems such as incorrect deﬁnitions of technical
terms, application of incorrect tests, and misinterpretations of results. Second,
although many experts have identiﬁed problems with studies published by
law reviews, little is being done to remedy them.
This failure to improve is not for lack of ideas. Several methods experts
have cataloged the problems and oﬀered numerous suggestions for turning
things around. Some have attempted to clarify the rules of inference via articlelength tutorials. Others have suggested that student editors be required to
take courses in empirical methods taught by experts, that experts be added to
law review editorial boards, that nonexperts interested in producing empirical
work either enroll in short methods courses or ﬁnd methodologists willing to
co-author, and that law journals design and implement data- and proceduredisclosure policies to facilitate easier replication of published studies. The list
goes on. Only one of the ideas has taken hold. A number of universities oﬀer
short methods courses designed for law professors interested in producing
empirical legal studies. While these courses certainly hold promise, they might
unintentionally worsen the situation. The law professors gain knowledge
suﬃcient to use fancy statistical software to employ technical empirical models
to produce estimates that get neatly organized into impressive looking tables,
but at least some of the short courses provide insuﬃcient training to ensure
that the professors can employ the methods at a level that would satisfy expert
peer reviewers.
This essay argues that most ideas for improving law review editorial
practices have failed because they do not capitalize on the interests of inexpert
authors and student editors. To increase the chance of improving quality, the
infrastructure of the publication system must be altered to generate incentives
for authors to produce high-quality work, and some combination of carrots
and sticks must be eﬀectively employed to encourage student editors to ensure
high-quality publications. Both authors and students have incentives to
protect their reputations. Authors who submit empirical studies to law reviews
might take steps to increase the quality of their work if critical reviews of it
were posted publicly. Student editors might do more to ensure publication
of only high-quality empirical studies if journals were publicly graded on the
quality of published studies and their policies related to pre-publication peer
review and data availability. The purpose of this essay is to argue that change
will occur only if those with the power to eﬀect change have suﬃciently strong
incentives to improve.
Who would expend the eﬀort to take such steps? The proposal in the
following pages relies on an assumption that a suﬃcient number of methods
experts will pitch in to do the work required to generate strong incentives
for change. These experts do a far bit now to promote high-quality empirical
legal scholarship. Experts expend eﬀort, for example, as directors and
members of the Society for Empirical Legal Studies, an academic association
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designed to encourage empirical work on legal issues, to stimulate interaction
among scholars in law and other academic ﬁelds and to organize an annual
conference on empirical legal studies.1 This essay proposes the addition of a
fourth mission: to join the eﬀorts of empiricists in other ﬁelds who are working
to reinvigorate conﬁdence in published empirical work.
The essay is organized as follows. I ﬁrst make the easy argument for the
value of empirical legal studies. I then describe the ongoing quality crisis,
not only in the law review literature but also in empirical literature across
virtually all ﬁelds. I argue that the legal academy should join in the eﬀorts
in other disciplines to bolster conﬁdence in published empirical work. The
legal academy should, at the same time, take steps to remedy much more basic
problems that tend not to plague peer-reviewed empirical scholarship, such
as the use of objectively incorrect statistical tests and empirical speciﬁcations
and the drawing of invalid inferences from empirical results. After laying out
a set of possible causes of these basic problems, the essay oﬀers a number of
proposed solutions designed to capitalize on the interests of inexpert authors
and inexpert editors. The solutions call for instituting incentives for authors
and editors to increase the quality of published empirical work. I suggest that
existing academic societies already engaged in building infrastructures to
foster empirical work are best-suited to institute such incentives.
Value of Empirical Legal Scholarship
Few doubt the value of empirical legal scholarship.2 It contributes both
to the development of “a mature legal science,”3 which aids in our endeavor
to accurately describe and explain what we observe, and to informed
policymaking. In both the sciences and social sciences, valid empirical data
analysis is essential to verifying predictions based on theories and thus to
developing conﬁdence in the theories themselves. Researchers verify by
deriving precise hypotheses from the theory under investigation, collecting
data—from the ﬁeld or from the laboratory, for example—and analyzing the
1.

THE SOCIETY FOR EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES, HTTP://WWW.LAWSCHOOL.CORNELL.EDU/SELS/
ABOUT.CFM (last visited July 30, 2016).

2.

See generally Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807 (1999);
Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making
and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819 [hereinafter Heise, Judicial Decision Making]
(comprising just one paper of a number of papers in a symposium issue dedicated to
arguing for the beneﬁts of empirical legal scholarship and encouraging its production). I
adopt Michael Heise’s deﬁnition of “empirical legal scholarship” as “the subset of empirical
legal scholarship that uses statistical techniques and analyses. By statistical techniques and
analyses I mean studies that employ data . . . that facilitate descriptions of or inferences to a
larger sample or population as well as replication by other scholars.” Heise, Judicial Decision
Making, supra, at 821.

3.

Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientiﬁc Method in the
Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 875, 900 (2002) (“[E]mpirical work is an absolutely vital
part of the development of a mature legal science.”).
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data to conﬁrm or disprove the hypotheses. Empirical veriﬁcation is critical in
our endeavor to develop models with strong predictive value.
The stronger a theory’s predictive value, the more conﬁdently we can apply
the theory in prospective policymaking. Empirical validation helps us move
from a conversation in the pages of academic literature to the application
of science in the form of evidence-based policy. Theory is useful. Theory
backed by a single, methodologically sound empirical study is better. We get
closer to the ideal, however, when the theory we wish to apply is supported
by a collection of methodologically sound empirical studies from a variety
of contexts using a number of diﬀerent methods and diﬀerent data samples
drawn from relevant populations. While robust empirical veriﬁcation cannot
guarantee that some adopted policy will work as intended, it can help guide us
toward policies with the best chance of fulﬁlling their promise.
The usefulness of empirical legal research, however, depends heavily on the
methods employed to produce it and on the validity of the inferences drawn
from reported results. Its value diminishes if researchers fail to employ best
practices and publishers of such studies do not maintain eﬀective checks on
the quality of published work.
Continuing Crisis of Low Quality
The quality of scholarship published in student-edited law reviews has been
under attack for some time.4 In more recent challenges, critics have railed
against the poor quality of empirical legal studies published by the reviews.5
My ongoing conversations with colleagues suggest that many in the legal
academy and beyond share this negative appraisal. Likely few would dispute
the claim that the average quality of empirical work published in law reviews
lies somewhere below that of work published in peer-reviewed journals.6
4.

See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, “The Most Remarkable Institution”: The American Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 1 (1986); Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Student-Edited Law Review, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1131 (1995); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936-1937); Fred Rodell,
Goodbye to Law Reviews—Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 (1962). Undoubtedly the legal academy
continues to lament the low quality of all types of work published in student-edited law
journals. The problems with quality certainly are not limited to empirical studies. The larger
quality issues are beyond the scope of this narrow essay. The essay’s bottom line, that quality
improvements require capitalizing on the interests of the actors with control over quality, can
be generalized to other types of scholarship published in law reviews.

5.

See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss, When Do Facts Persuade? Some Thoughts on the Market for “Empirical
Legal Studies,” 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17 (2008); Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of
Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002). See also Frank Cross, Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk,
Above the Rules: A Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 135, 149 (2002) (forwarding
a milder critique than Epstein and King’s, but conceding that “[t]o be sure, the quality of
scholarship (empirical and nonempirical, theoretical and doctrinal) that appears in studentedited law reviews varies, sometimes tremendously.”).

6.

But see Theodore Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical Legal Studies and a Response
to Concerns (Cornell Law Faculty Publ’ns Paper 974, 2011), http://scholarship.law.cornell.
edu/facpub/974.
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To be sure, peer review is hardly a panacea when it comes to ensuring
quality.7 In fact, the social sciences academy is in the midst of its own quality
crisis.8 Recently methodologists have attempted to replicate results published
in top social sciences journals with mixed success.9 Others have produced
evidence that journals suﬀer from publication bias, the tendency of editors
to publish statistically signiﬁcant results over null results.10 This bias leads to
an imbalance in published studies in the sense that studies that fail to identify
predicted eﬀects are less likely to see the light of day relative to those that
ﬁnd, perhaps just by chance, statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects. Still others have
been working on ways to detect tricks researchers use to produce statistically
signiﬁcant results with the hopes of easing the road to publication.11 Such
ﬁndings suggest that the current peer-review system used by academic journals
is insuﬃcient to ensure high quality.
The legal academy and researchers in the social sciences have reacted
diﬀerently to these concerns. Social science researchers have taken steps to
advance solutions and reestablish credibility. Following the ﬁrestorm against
psychology studies in 2012, Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman wrote an open
letter to academic psychologists imploring them to “do something . . . and
7.

See Gregory Mitchell, Empirical Legal Scholarship as Scientiﬁc Dialogue, 83 N.C. L. REV. 167, 175
(2004) (reviewing critiques of peer review, oﬀering a defense of the system and ultimately
suggesting that student-edited law journals “compel[] the disclosure of important
information about empirical research using a common methodological language so that the
research may be subjected to critical scrutiny.”).

8.

See, e.g., John Ioannidis & Chris Doucouliagos, What’s to Know About the Credibility of Empirical
Economics?, 27 J. ECON. SURVS. 997 (2013). Similar problems have been identiﬁed in medical
research and the hard sciences more generally. See, e.g., John P.A. Ioannidis, Why Most Published
Research Findings Are False, 2 PLOS MED. 0696 (2005). I focus here on the identiﬁed problems
and reactions to them in the social sciences.

9.

ANDREW C. CHANG & PHILLIP LI, Is Economics Research Replicable? Sixty Published Papers from
Thirteen Journals Say “Usually Not”, FIN. & ECON. DISCUSSION SERIES 2015-083 (2015), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2015/ﬁles/2015083pap.pdf; Colin F. Camerer et
al., Evaluating Replicability of Laboratory Experiments in Economics, 351 SCIENCE 1433 (2016); Stéphane
Doyen et al., Behavioral Priming: It’s All in the Mind, but Whose Mind?, 7 PLOS ONE e29081 (2012);
Stuart J. Ritchie et al., Failing the Future: Three Unsuccessful Attempts to Replicate Bem’s ‘Retroactive
Facilitation of Recall’ Eﬀect, 7 PLOS ONE e33423 (2012); Open Science Collaboration, Estimating
the Reproducibility of Psychological Science, 349 SCIENCE 943 (2015). A healthy battle over the
soundness of the replication methodology has ensued. See, e.g., Christopher J. Anderson
et al., Response to Comment on “Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science,” 351 SCIENCE 1037
(2016); Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Comment on “Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science,” 351
SCIENCE 1037 (2016).

10.

See, e.g., Gregory Francis, Publication Bias and the Failure of Replication in Experimental Psychology, 19
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 975 (2012); John P.A. Ioannidis et al., The Power of Bias in Economics
Research (Deakin Univ. Working Paper No. 1, 2016), https://www.deakin.edu.au/__data/
assets/pdf_ﬁle/0007/477763/2016_1.pdf.

11.

See, e.g., Joseph P. Simmons et al., False-Positive Psychology: Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection
and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as Signiﬁcant, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1359 (2011).
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. . . do it collectively.”12 In response, a set of thirty-six research groups from
around the globe formed the Many Labs Replication Project.13 The goal of the
project was to replicate thirteen eﬀects reported in widely cited psychological
studies.14 They published all data sets and procedures through the Open
Science Framework.15 The Berkeley Initiative for Transparency in the Social
Sciences was established in 2012 to “strengthen the quality of social science
research and evidence used for policy-making.”16 A number of psychologists
are now heading up projects to replicate ﬁndings and promote disclosure of
materials suﬃcient to perform such replications.17 Several private foundations
recently donated $10 million to the Center for Open Science, founded in 2013
and directed by members of the academy to “increase openness, integrity, and
reproducibility of scientiﬁc research.”18
The ﬁeld of political science has also taken steps toward increasing research
transparency, including access to data. In 2010, the American Political Science
Association (APSA) formed an ad hoc committee to formulate a plan.19
The committee grew into an organization called Data Access & Research
Transparency (DA-RT). Members of DA-RT drafted an ethics guide that
was eventually adopted by APSA. In addition, a consortium of twenty-seven
political science journal editors signed a joint statement to commit individually
to implement a set of transparency policies by January 2016.20 Two scholars
kicked oﬀ the Political Science Replication Initiative to encourage and
facilitate replication of empirical studies in political science.21
A similar movement is occurring in economics, but progress seems slower.
A growing (but still small) number of economics journals have instituted
data-availability policies with the goal of ensuring that those who wish to
12.

Open Letter from Daniel Kahneman, NATURE (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.nature.com/
polopoly_fs/7.6716.1349271308!/suppinfoFile/Kahneman%20Letter.pdf (suggesting that
social psychologists who run experiments set up a “daisy chain” of replications).

13.

MANY LAB, HTTPS://OSF.IO/89VQH/ (last visited July 26, 2016).

14.

Id. Ten of the results were successfully replicated.

15.

Richard A. Klein et al., Investigating Variation in Replicability: A “Many Labs” Replication Project, OPEN
SCI. FRAMEWORK, https://osf.io/wx7ck/ (last visited July 30, 2016).

16.

Mission and Objectives, BERKELEY INITIATIVE
org/about/ (last visited July 30, 2016).

17.

Amy Novotney, Reproducing Results, 45 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 32 (2014), http://www.apa.
org/monitor/2014/09/results.aspx. See also, Replication in Economics, REPLICATIONWIKI, http://
replication.uni-goettingen.de/wiki/index.php/Main_Page (last visited July 30, 2016).

18.

COS Mission, CTR. FOR OPEN SCI., https://cos.io/about_mission/ (last visited July 30, 2016).

19.

About DART, DATA ACCESS & RES. TRANSPARENCY, http://www.dartstatement.org/#!about/
c24vq (last visited July 30, 2016).

20.

The Journal Editors’ Transparency Statement (JETS), DATA ACCESS & RES. TRANSPARENCY, http://
www.dartstatement.org/#!blank/c22sl (last visited July 30, 2016).

21.

POL. SCI. REPLICATION INITIATIVE,
(last visited July 30, 2016).

FOR

TRANSPARENCY SOC. SCI., http://www.bitss.

HTTP://PROJECTS.IQ.HARVARD.EDU/PSREPLICATION/HOME
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attempt replication of published results have the necessary information.22
Researchers from the U.K. and New Zealand have formed the Replication
Network, a website designed to “serve[ ] as a channel of communication
to (i) update scholars about the state of replications in economics, and (ii)
establish a network for the sharing of information and ideas.”23 Economists
have oﬀered ideas on how to create demand for replication.24 Others have
nudged us toward methods that physicists have adopted to avoid bias caused
by “the desire to support one’s theory, to refute one’s competitors, to be ﬁrst
to report a phenomenon, or simply to avoid publishing ‘odd’ results.”25 The
Allied Social Science Association held a workshop on replication in economics
during its 2016 annual meeting.26 Researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank are
calling for the creation of a journal dedicated solely to replication.27 The newly
formed Critical Finance Review recently announced its plan to publish issues
“dedicated to replicating the most inﬂuential empirical papers in ﬁnancial
economics.”28
While empirical legal studies published in student-edited law reviews are
experiencing the same problems currently plaguing the social sciences, they
22.

Sven Vlaeminck, Research Data Management in Economic Journals, OPEN ECON., http://
openeconomics.net/resources/data-policies-of-economic-journals/ [https://perma.cc/
FXG7-X8TT] (last visited July 26, 2016) (reporting that 21% of a sample of 141 high-ranking
economics journals had a data availability policy in place). A recent study reports, however,
that very few of the journals with such policies consistently enforce them. Sven Vlaeminck
& Lisa-Kristin Herrmann, Data Policies and Data Archives: A New Paradigm for Academic Publishing
in Economic Sciences?, in NEW AVENUES FOR ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING IN THE AGE OF INFINITE
COLLECTIONS AND CITIZEN SCIENCE: SCALE, OPENNESS AND TRUST 145 (Birgit Schmidt &
Milena Dobreva eds., 2015). Seventy-six percent of journals from a sample of economics
journals (n = 346) with data availability policies (n = 71) require authors to submit data and
procedures with the initial submission or before publication. Id. Twenty percent with data
availability policies failed to make available the required information for any article in four
issues investigated. Id. Only one journal with a policy made available data and procedures
for every article in four issues. Id.

23.

REPLICATION NETWORK, HTTPS://REPLICATIONNETWORK.COM/ (last visited July 26, 2016).

24.

See John Cochrane, Secret Data, THE GRUMPY ECONOMIST (Dec. 28, 2015), http://
johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/2015/12/secret-data.html (suggesting ways to create demand
for replication including refusing to referee a paper if the author does not provide the data
and procedures used to produce results, refusing to cite to articles if the data and procedures
are not accessible, disclosing in tenure letters whether the candidate makes all data and
procedures available, refusing to discuss conference papers unless the data and procedures
are accessible, and refusing to invite to conferences those who do not disclose their data and
procedures).

25.

Robert MacCoun & Saul Perlmutter, Blind Analysis: Hide Results to Seek the Truth, 526 NATURE
187, 187-88 (2015).

26.

Replication and Transparency in Economic Research, INST. FOR NEW ECON. THINKING, http://
ineteconomics.org/community/events/replication-and-transparency-in-economic-research
(last visited July 26, 2016).

27.

Christian Zimmermann, On the Need for a Replication Journal (Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis,
Working Paper, No. 2015-016-A, 2015), http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2015/2015-016.pdf.

28.

RFP, CRITICAL FIN. REV., http://cfr.ivo-welch.info/RFP.html (last updated Jan. 2016).
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are grappling with much more basic problems, most of which likely are wrung
out of studies published in peer-reviewed journals. Epstein and King list
many of the problems caused by a lack of adherence to the standard rules of
inference.29 From my perspective, the problems are even more basic than their
list suggests. Objective errors—errors that methodologists would uniformly
agree are mistakes—seem common. A handful of examples include:
1. incorrectly deﬁning statistical terms such as “p-value” and “statistical
signiﬁcance”;
2. misinterpreting regression results (e.g., interpreting results as supporting claims of causation when they support only claims of correlation;
misinterpreting a null result as proof of no causal relationship);
3. incorrectly applying statistical tests (e.g., performing a simple t-test on
samples not drawn from mutually exclusive populations or when the
population variances of two mutually exclusive groups are known to be
unequal); and
4. failing to account for and verify assumptions necessary to produce valid
results (e.g., the commonly employed ordinary least squares regression
model assumes independent observations, linearity, the absence of observations that exert undue inﬂuence on the estimates, and normally
distributed residuals, to name a few).
Given the lack of controversy around whether these types of problems
constitute errors, we might ask whether we should expend any eﬀort to reduce
the likelihood that studies plagued by these sorts of basic errors get published.
It could be that readers easily detect such errors and place appropriately low
weight on invalid results. Even if this is the case, problematic studies can slow
down scientiﬁc progress by shifting time and attention away from forward
momentum and toward error correction.30 On the policy front, concern might
be quelled by claims that policymakers don’t read anything published in law
journals, let alone empirical work published in them.31 Others assert, however,
that at least some legislators, judges and others who craft law and make
policy do refer to law journal publications32 and that the articles inﬂuence (or
at least justify) policy choices.33 A (likely very) noisy estimate of how often
29.

Epstein & King, supra note 5.

30.

Michele Landis Dauber, The Big Muddy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1899, 1912 (2005) (arguing that prepublication peer review is crucial because if low-quality work is published, disputes over
methods must be played out in public). Others worry that “sensational sound bites” from
problematic studies can become “political tools.” Elizabeth Chambliss, supra note 5, at 29.

31.

See e.g., Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot About Legal Scholarship?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 295 (2000).

32.

See e.g., David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts of
Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1345 (2011).

33.

See Epstein & King, supra note 5, at 2, 4-6 (“[R]esearch that oﬀers claims or makes inferences
based on observations about the real world—on topics ranging from the imposition of the
death penalty to the eﬀect of court decisions on administrative agencies to the causes of fraud
in the bankruptcy system to the use of various alternative dispute resolution mechanisms—
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courts mention empirical studies published in law reviews suggests that these
studies get at least some play in litigation.34 Epstein and King note that “[t]he
staying power of ﬂawed and discredited legal studies can be extraordinary.”35
While studies with basic ﬂaws certainly are not totally devoid of value,36 they
potentially cause more harm than good. At a minimum, the fact that our
publication system does not weed them out raises concerns about the general
quality of empirical legal studies published in law reviews, which potentially
distracts us from important ﬁndings.
Proposed solutions with the most promise to increase the quality of
empirical work in law reviews must account for the factors that allow poor
quality studies to make it into and to slip through the editing process. The
next section oﬀers speciﬁcs about drivers that lead to low quality publications.
‘can play an important role in public discourse . . . and can aﬀect our political system’s
handling’ of many issues.”) (citing Ronald J. Tabak, How Empirical Studies Can Aﬀect Positively
the Politics of the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1431, 1431 (1998). See also Tracey L. Meares,
Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in Criminal Law and Procedures—And Three Answers, 2002 UNIV.
ILL. L. REV. 851, 853-57 (discussing the fact that judges are not trained to evaluate the quality
of empirical research and pointing to examples of checks on the system that might help,
including training judges and relying on the adversarial nature of our adjudicatory process).
34.

I searched all state and federal cases in Lexis Advance using the following query: empirical
w/s (“lj.” or “l. rev.” or “l.rev.” or “j.l.” or “law review”), limiting the search to cases
published from Jan. 1, 1970, to present (July 30, 2016). LEXIS ADVANCE RES., HTTPS://
ADVANCE.LEXIS.COM (last visited July 30, 2016). The Cases database includes both reported
and unreported cases in federal and state jurisdictions. The search returned 1084 opinions
split roughly evenly between federal court opinions (566) and state court opinions (518). A
histogram of frequency by year reported by Lexis suggests that the number of citations has
increased over time:

Unfortunately, Lexis does not provide counts on the graph’s vertical axis. The search is
both underinclusive and overinclusive. Some empirical studies published in law reviews do
not include the word “empirical” in the title, and articles with the word “empirical” in the
title are not necessarily empirical studies. Note also that mentions are not always citations
to support a court’s claim. For example, they might refer to studies cited in briefs submitted
to the court. The point of the back-of-the-envelope count is to provide some rough evidence
for the claim that empirical studies published in law reviews do make their way into briefs
and opinions.
35.

Epstein & King, supra note 5, at 17 n.42.

36.

Faulty studies often raise interesting and important questions and can prompt others to
employ sound methods to search for answers. See Theodore Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature,
and Promise of Empirical Legal Studies and a Response to Concerns, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1721-22,
1730-31.
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Potential Causes
How do basic errors survive the law review publication process? Both the
authors of the studies and journals’ editorial boards play a role. On the author
side, lack of training, inadequate training and incentives to publish empirical
research drive low quality. First, some authors of low-quality studies have little
methodological training, if any at all.37 Law reviews generally do not require
authors of empirical studies to have any sort of empirical-methods training.
To my knowledge, law review editors do not systematically assess authors’
credentials when selecting articles for publication.
Second, and potentially more harmful, many obtain insuﬃcient training.
Law professors now have access to a number of short methods courses. The
Center for Empirical Research in the Law at Washington University (St.
Louis), for example, ran the fourteenth annual Conducting Empirical Legal
Scholarship Workshop in June 2015.38 The workshop is designed for “law
school faculty, political science faculty, and graduate students interested in
learning about empirical research and how to evaluate empirical work.”39
The workshop promises to provide “the formal training necessary to design,
conduct, and assess empirical studies, and to use statistical software . . . to
analyze and manage data.”40 Topics include (but are not limited to) research
design, data sampling methods, statistical inference, hypothesis testing, linear
regression analysis, discrete choice modeling, graphic display of data, and
how to use a popular statistical software package.41 The program is taught
by two of the best methodologists in the ﬁeld of empirical legal studies.42 In
theory, this sort of course might go a long way to increase the production
of empirical legal scholarship. This course, however, and others like it are
problematic in that they attempt to teach material generally covered over at
least three semesterlong courses43 for law professors, some of whom likely
have no background or knowledge of statistics,44 in just three days. Even if we
37.

Epstein & King, supra note 5, at 9.

38.

My intent here is not to single out this program. It’s similar to a number of programs that
law schools and other organizations run in an attempt to teach empirical methods to legal
scholars.

39.

Conducting Empirical Legal Scholarship Workshop 2015, CTR. FOR EMPIRICAL RES. L., http://cerl.
wustl.edu/training/cels15.php (last visited July 26, 2016) [hereinafter Scholarship Workshop].

40.

Id.

41.

Id.

42.

Id.

43.

The topics listed generally are covered in a course on statistics, a course on regression
analysis and a course on discrete choice models, all semester-long courses.

44.

“Participants need no background or knowledge of statistics to enroll in the workshop.”
Scholarship Workshop, supra note 39. George Mason’s Law & Economics Center runs a similar
training workshop that runs for ﬁve days and requires no background in empirics. LEC
Workshop on Empirical Methods for Law Professors, L. & ECON CTR., GEO. MASON U. SCH. L.,
http://masonlec.org/events/event/226-lec-workshop-empirical-methods-law-professors
(last visited July 27, 2016).
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assume that the average law professor can get up to speed with substantially
less instruction than formally trained methodologists get, it certainly requires
more than three days. Perhaps the most damaging aspect of these types of
courses is that they provide basic training on how to use statistical software
packages, allowing for the production of results that are often invalid but seem
sophisticated to the untrained, student-editor eye.45
45.

The University of Michigan’s Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research
(ICPSR) oﬀers a number of summer courses ranging in length from two days to four weeks.
Summer Program in Quantitative Methods of Social Research, ICPSR, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
icpsrweb/sumprog/index.jsp (last visited July 27, 2016). Each course assumes diﬀerent levels
of knowledge. For example, the four-day course on multivariate modeling with Stata and R
assumes “only familiarity with introductory statistics.” Multivariate Modeling with Stata and R,
ICSPR, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/sumprog/courses/0175 (last visited July 27,
2016). The course packs quite a bit into four days:
We begin with a review/crash course in the linear multiple regression model, and then
move on to other important multivariate models including binomial logit and probit
models, the multinomial logit model and the mixed logit model. The workshop then
considers the interpretation of interaction eﬀects in linear and nonlinear models as well
as multilevel models that analyze how socio-economic and political contexts inﬂuence
individual behavior. Time series and pooled time series methods that investigate how
factors such as policy interventions and socio-economic conditions aﬀect dynamic
outcomes also are considered. Additional topics, such as the analysis of spatial
statistical models will be covered, based on student interests and time availability.
Id. Four days likely are insuﬃcient to cover even one of these topics in the depth required to
allow for the production of high-quality empirical work.
Northwestern University oﬀers a ﬁve-day workshop on causal inference designed for
“[q]uantitative empirical researchers (faculty and graduate students) in social science . . . .”
2016 Main Causal Inference Workshop, NW. SCH. L., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/researchfaculty/conferences/causalinference/frequentist/ (last visited July 27, 2016). Organizers
assume
knowledge, at the level of an upper-level college econometrics or similar course, of
multivariate regression, including OLS, logit, and probit; basic probability and
statistics including conditional and compound probabilities, conﬁdence intervals,
t-statistics, and standard errors; and some understanding of instrumental variables.
Despite its modest prerequisites, this course should be suitable for most researchers
with PhD level training and for empirical legal scholars with reasonable but more
limited training.
Id. Temporary statistical software licenses are provided; thus, it’s possible that those with
the elusive “reasonable but more limited” training are able to learn just enough to use the
software to produce results but not enough to produce valid results.
Others have forwarded similar claims that use of sophisticated tools by unsophisticated
researchers might reduce overall quality of empirical legal scholarship. See John F. Pfaﬀ,
A Plea for More Aggregation: The Looming Threat to Empirical Legal Scholarship 3-4
(July 16, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641435 (“The rise
of the powerful desktop computer and user-friendly statistics software has been a mixed
blessing for empirical work. On the one hand, the high-quality work, relying on large
datasets and powerful statistical and computational techniques, has never been better. On
the other hand, the low-quality work has likely never been worse, as a growing pool of
unsophisticated researchers try their hands at empirical analysis. Overall average quality
may even be declining.”).
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Third, the legal academy is encouraging the production of empirical legal
studies by all who are willing to produce them.46 Some law schools have
started to fund empirical legal scholarship.47 Law school libraries have created
webpages devoted to empirical legal research.48 While these eﬀorts certainly
increase the production of high-quality empirical work, they also lower the
barriers to entry for those without suﬃcient credentials, who are more likely
to produce low-quality work. Requirements for tenure often include positive
reviews of scholarship by scholars writing in the same ﬁeld as the candidate, but
law school tenure committees are not required to request reviews from internal
and external colleagues with adequate methods training, and committees
might have an incentive to bypass such reviewers to increase the likelihood
of obtaining positive letters. Of course, once tenure is secured, incentives to
produce high-quality empirical work are weakened by the ability to publish
low-quality work in law reviews and the low probability that the published
work will be challenged given the lack of incentives for empiricists to publicly
criticize the methods of ﬂawed studies.49 This developing infrastructure fosters
the production of empirical legal research, but it does not guarantee quality at
even the most basic levels.
The problems on the supply side are exacerbated on the demand side. Law
students are the sole members of the vast majority of law journal editorial
boards. They have complete discretion over which articles to publish and
requirements for ﬁnal versions that appear in the pages of law reviews. Many
in the academy have lamented the fact that law students are not qualiﬁed to
46.

Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.
J. 141, 141-42 (2006) (“Empirical legal scholarship (ELS) is arguably the next big thing in
legal intellectual thought. . . . ELS recently and dramatically has expanded in law reviews,
at conferences, and among leading law faculties.”).

47.

For example, see Shana Jackson, Library Tip: Empirical Legal Research Support, YALE L. SCH. (Nov.
9, 2015, 11:22 AM), http://library.law.yale.edu/news/library-tip-empirical-legal-researchsupport (oﬀering support for Yale law students to perform empirical legal studies, which
they sometimes use as job market papers on the entry-level law school job market).

48.

See, e.g., Empirical Legal Research, ROBERT CROWN L. LIBRARY, STAN. L. SCH., https://law.
stanford.edu/robert-crown-law-library/research-resources/empirical-legal-research/
(last
visited July 27, 2016); Empirical Legal Research, LILLIAN GOLDMAN L. LIBRARY, YALE L. SCH.,
http://library.law.yale.edu/tags/empirical-legal-research (last visited July 27, 2016).

49.

Exceptions exist. For example, the Stanford Law Review (in volume 57, issue 6, May 2005)
published several critiques of Richard Sander’s empirical study of the impacts of aﬃrmative
action policies in law school admissions. See e.g., Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Does Aﬃrmative
Action Reduce the Number of Black Lawyers?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807 (2005); David L. Chambers et
al., The Real Impact of Eliminating Aﬃrmative Action in American Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of
Richard Sander’s Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855 (2005). In addition, Ian Ayres and John Donohue
famously challenged the work of John Lott and David Mustard. See Ian Ayres & John J.
Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193 (2003)
(critiquing John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed
Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1997)).
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select and edit legal studies, including empirical legal studies.50 Law review
editors seem intrigued by empirical studies related to legal topics, despite the
fact that they are diﬃcult to assess. For years, law reviews have been dominated
by doctrinal and theoretical work. Empirical studies are relatively new to
the scene, and their novelty and apparent usefulness make them especially
appealing. Very few law students, however, are suﬃciently trained in empirical
methods to assess the quality of the work researchers submit. In many cases,
the articles are published without any technical assessment. In some cases,
law review editors request a review by a trained member of their law school’s
faculty. Occasionally, law review editors will seek out a methodologist outside
their home school’s faculty with knowledge of the study’s substantive ﬁeld.
Peer review, though, is neither systematically sought nor required. Further,
reputation eﬀects are minimal at best. By the time published work is publicly
criticized, the students responsible for publication have graduated. The rapid
turnover of boards (once per year) makes it diﬃcult for boards to implement
and sustain policies to improve quality. In short, law journal editorial boards
do not have the necessary training to identify high-quality empirical research
nor the appropriate incentives to ensure that only high-quality empirical work
is published. This, in turn, creates an incentive for scholars to submit lowquality empirical work that they believe might capture the attention of editors.
And so it goes.
Many have recognized the quality problem and have oﬀered suggestions to
address it, but few solutions have taken hold, and some might have worsened
the problem. The next section catalogs some of the suggestions and argues
that they have failed to generate incentives both for scholars to produce highquality work and for editors to publish only high-quality work. The section
goes on to suggest ways to capitalize on the interests of scholars and editors
to generate incentives for the production and publication of high-quality
empirical legal studies.
Generating Incentives for High Quality
During the past couple decades, scholars have suggested ways to increase
the quality of empirical scholarship published in law reviews. Epstein and
King, for example, oﬀer a set of suggestions, some of which are geared toward
law student editors and others toward law school faculties.51 They suggest law
schools oﬀer courses in empirical research taught by trained methodologists
and argue that law review editors be required to take a course with a focus on
empirical research design.52 They recommend that law schools encourage law
faculty interested in producing empirical research to develop the necessary
methodological skills by taking methods courses, by attending short summer
50.

See, e.g., Epstein & King, supra note 5 (reviewing complaints that have been published in the
literature); Posner, supra note 4, at 1132-35.

51.

Epstein & King, supra note 5, at 115. See also Lee Epstein & Gary King, Building an Infrastructure
for Empirical Research in the Law, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (2003).

52.

Epstein & King, supra note 5, at 116.
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training programs, and by collaborating with trained methodologists.53 They
advocate ways law schools can supply the resources necessary to support
empirically minded faculty, such as providing necessary software and
hardware, providing generous research assistance, oﬀering funding for data
sets and other necessary ingredients, and providing the infrastructure required
to obtain external funding. They advise adding faculty members to law review
editorial boards, requiring at least one blind peer review of each empirical
article by a reviewer who has some expertise in the methods employed and the
substantive area of law addressed by the work, and requiring board approval
of all empirical articles before publication.54 They also push for law review
editors to establish data archiving policies that allow for easy replication of
published results.55
Despite the myriad suggestions for ways to improve, little has changed in
the way that law reviews select and edit empirical articles. Highly credentialed
faculty are teaching empirical methods courses in a handful of law schools,
53.

Id. at 119-20. Others have suggested that the legal academy has already moved a long way in
this direction by hiring researchers trained in both law and empirical methods, by fostering
collaboration between law scholars and methodologists, and by funding research workshops
that bring together researchers from diﬀerent disciplines. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, A Defense
of Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 169 (2002). David Van Zandt recommends the
Northwestern Law School approach of hiring dually trained faculty who are capable of
producing high-quality empirical legal research, supporting new and existing faculty who
wish to pursue graduate degrees, insisting on greater productivity and quality in tenure and
promotions, and placing greater weight on peer-reviewed scholarship in scholarship reviews.
David E. Van Zandt, Discipline-Based Faculty, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 332 (2003).

54.

Epstein & King, supra note 5, at 127-28. See also Dauber, supra note 30, (echoing a call for peer
review and citing to others who have done the same). Others are more pessimistic. Jack
Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule warn that the peer-review process might stiﬂe innovation in
scholarship. See Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 162 (2002) (“Peer review systems also raise the concern that senior
scholars favor like-minded scholarship and choke oﬀ the channels of intellectual change and
development.”). Matthew Spitzer has voiced skepticism, predicting that authors facing peer
review by both student-edited law reviews and peer-reviewed journals would opt to submit
only to peer-reviewed journals to enjoy the beneﬁts of working with professionals rather
than students during the editing process. Matthew Spitzer, Evaluating Valuing Empiricism (at
Law Schools), 53 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 328 (2003). This assumes, however, that a suﬃcient number
of slots exist in peer-review journals to ﬁll the demand for publication of empirical legal
studies. In any event, Spitzer convincingly argues that moving to peer review would be
costly in terms of the faculty time required, and that it would be politically diﬃcult to wrest
full control from student editors.

55.

Epstein & King, supra note 5, at 130-33. Epstein and King also encourage empiricists to make
their data available and to advertise their availability on their CVs, and call for law schools
to reward researchers for doing so. Gregory Mitchell elaborates on the beneﬁts of a push for
journals to require a set of disclosures, including information about the methods employed
to produce results, data analysis procedures and raw data, suggesting that it might act as
a primary way to improve the “scientiﬁc dialogue.” Mitchell, supra note 7. Michele Landis
Dauber suggests that law reviews refuse to publish studies unless the author makes the data
available for replication purposes. Dauber, supra note 30, at 1907-08. Matthew Spitzer agreed
with the idea of documentation requirements and wrote that he planned to take the idea to
a meeting of law school deans. See Spitzer, supra note 54.
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but no school to my knowledge requires journal editors to take any such
course.56 Some dually trained scholars are publishing high-quality empirical
studies in law reviews, but likely a larger number of insuﬃciently trained law
faculty are able to place low-quality work in the reviews. No editorial boards,
to my knowledge, include faculty members, and only two journals mention a
peer-review process in their submission instructions.57 Some are reaching out
to methodologists to ask for help reviewing submitted work, but most journals
have no system in place to check quality. Finally, just a small handful of top
journals currently require disclosure of data and/or procedures for replication
purposes.58 If we have any hopes of eﬀectuating change, we need to diagnose
56.

At least one law school (Cornell) oﬀers an optional course on empirical legal studies
speciﬁcally designed for law review editors. E-mail from Dawn Chutkow, Visiting Prof. of
Law & Exec. Ed. of Journal of Empirical Legal Scholarship, to author (May 19, 2015). The course
was developed after student editors requested methods training. Id.

57.

As of June 2016, websites for the main law reviews of law schools included in the top
twenty of either the 2017 U.S. News & World Report law school ranking or Washington and
Lee University’s law journal ranking using combined score and limited to student-edited
journals included the following policies on peer review of submissions. See 2017 Best Law
Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/
best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools (last visited July 30, 2016); Law Journals: Submissions
and Ranking, WASH. & LEE U. SCH. L. L. LIBRARY, http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/ (last visited
July 30, 2016). Stanford conducts peer review of each article submission. Article Submissions,
STAN. L. REV., https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/submissions/issue-article/ (last visited
July 30, 2016) [hereinafter Stanford Submissions]. Harvard subjects “many pieces” to faculty
peer review. Submissions, HARV. L. REV., http://harvardlawreview.org/submissions/ (last
visited July 30, 2016); Columbia “strongly prefers” to subject submissions to peer review,
but whether that happens depends on selection time frames and other extenuating
circumstances. Submissions Instructions, COLUM. L. REV., http://columbialawreview.org/
submissions-instructions/ (last visited July 30, 2016). University of Chicago “occasionally”
conducts peer review. Submissions, U. CHI. L. REV., https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/page/
submissions (last visited July 30, 2016). Yale and NYU have an “extensive review process,”
without mention of peer review. Volume 126 Submission Guidelines, YALE L.J., http://www.
yalelawjournal.org/ﬁles/V126SubmissionsGuidelines_fnm1a455.pdf (last visited July 30,
2016) [hereinafter Yale Submissions]; Submissions, N.Y.U. L. REV., http://www.nyulawreview.org/
submissions (last visited July 30, 2016) [hereinafter NYU Submissions]. The other top schools
(Penn, UC Berkeley, Michigan, UVA, Duke, Northwestern, Cornell, Georgetown, Texas
(Austin), Vanderbilt, Washington University (St. Louis), USC, Boston University, Iowa,
Minnesota, Fordham, Notre Dame, and UCLA) make no mention of peer review in their
online submission guide.

58.

As of July 2016, websites for the top twenty-four main law reviews (as deﬁned in footnote
57, supra) included the following policies: Yale recommends submission of the data. Yale
Submissions, supra note 57. Stanford, NYU and Northwestern require publication of data
on the journal’s website, with narrow exceptions (NYU and Northwestern do not require
submission of the data until after the article is accepted). Stanford Submissions, supra note 57; NYU
Submissions, supra note 57; Print Submissions, NW. L. REV., http://www.northwesternlawreview.
org/submissions (last visited July 30, 2016). UVA requires submission of data within seven
days of accepting an oﬀer to publish, encourages but does not require submission of data
at the time of submission, and states a strong preference that the data be publicly available
or disclosed upon request unless waived in extraordinary circumstances. Submissions, VA. L.
REV., http://www.virginialawreview.org/submissions/articles-essays (last visited July 30,
2016). Vanderbilt requires submission of procedures, methodology, or robustness checks
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why law students and faculty have not been inspired to change the methods
used to edit empirical studies in line with suggestions put forward over the
past decade.
One possibility might be that past proposals do not suﬃciently leverage the
interests of the actors with power to eﬀect change.59 Law students have little
interest in ensuring high-quality publications given that they spend at most
one year on the editorial board and their reputations do not depend directly
on the quality of the work they print in the issues published during their
short time at the helm. In the unlikely event that the quality of a published
study is challenged, the students can point to the author of the study as the
culpable party. This suggests that the authors of empirical studies might have
an incentive to avoid reputation hits, but the pressure is not suﬃciently strong.
While some studies on hot-button issues like the impacts of gun laws on crime60
and the eﬀects of aﬃrmative action programs in law school admissions on
the success of black lawyers61 are challenged publicly following publication,
researchers seem to have weak incentives, if any, to publicly criticize published
studies that contain basic errors.62 Thus, both authors who submit low-quality
empirical legal studies to law reviews and law review editors who select and
edit articles lack strong incentives to increase the quality of published work.
How might we better capitalize on the interests of authors and editors?
Both have an interest in protecting their reputations. The key is to put into
place mechanisms that will generate direct reputational hits for authors who
submit low-quality empirical studies and for editors who publish low-quality
studies that are impossible to replicate.
First, consider levers that might compel authors to take better care. Authors
likely would focus more on quality if they expected reviews of their studies
conducted by experts to be posted publicly. Certainly tenure-track law school
faculty members would have a strong incentive to avoid reviews that publicly
expose poor quality. Tenured faculty members’ incentives would not be as
strong, but the reputation eﬀects imposed by public reviews might be suﬃcient

not included in the body of the article to be included as an appendix to the article and
requests that the author prepare the data set to be sent upon request. Submissions, VAND. L.
REV., https://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/about/submissions/ (last visited July 30, 2016).
The other top schools (Harvard, Columbia, University of Chicago, Penn, UC Berkeley,
Michigan, Duke, Cornell, Georgetown, Texas (Austin), Washington (St. Louis), USC,
Boston University, Iowa, Minnesota, Fordham, Notre Dame and UCLA) have no posted
data disclosure policy.
59.

Matthew Spitzer recognized this early on. He lamented that change likely is impossible
from the inside due to lack of incentives for reform. Spitzer, supra note 54.

60.

See Ayres & Donohue, supra note 49.

61.

See 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1745-2170 (2005) (issue 6, published in May 2005).

62.

This claim is not based on any systematic empirical analysis. It is an assessment based on my
own informal review of tables of contents of law journals, economics journals, and law and
economics journals over the past decade.
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to compel at least some to take steps to avoid negative reviews, especially if
they are widely publicized.
How about incentives for student editors? Students might institute
changes if their journals were graded on the quality of published empirical
studies. Currently, the Law Journal Rankings Project, hosted by Washington
and Lee University’s School of Law, ranks law reviews annually based on a
combination of impact and citation counts.63 Some journals tout their ranking
on their websites.64 A Harvard Law School Library guide on deciding where
to publish refers to Washington and Lee’s ranking.65 Rankings are discussed in
popular online media outlets that cover law schools.66 Presumably law student
editors care about their ranking, and they take steps to publish articles that
will contribute maximally to the journal’s impact and citation scores. Student
editors compete for articles submitted by heavily cited authors. Some evidence
suggests students are motivated by journal prestige.67
Assuming these interests in fact motivate authors and students, we need
an infrastructure that creates incentives based on these interests. Experts are
needed to review published studies and journal policies and to compile and
maintain a journal grading system.68 Academic societies are natural collectors
of such experts. Further, they are well-positioned to take the lead in a serious
and sustained eﬀort to generate incentives for authors and editors. Society
boards comprise, at least in part, expert empirical methodologists.69 These
experts gain prestige through serving on the board, and the workload of
63.

Law Journals: Submissions and Ranking Explained, WASH. & LEE U. SCH. L. L. LIBRARY, http://
lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/method.asp (last visited July 27, 2016). Eigenfactor.org also publishes
a ranking of law-related journals using a method similar to the one Google uses to rank
websites. About the Eigenfactor Project, EIGENFACTOR, http://52.6.43.8/about.php (last visited
July 27, 2016); Journal Ranking for LAW, EIGENFACTOR, http://52.6.43.8/projects/journalRank/
rankings.php?search=OM&year=2014&searchby=isicat&orderby=Eigenfactor (last visited
July 27, 2016).

64.

The Google search “law journal rankings project” links to instances of such advertisements.

65.

June Casey, Publishing in Law Reviews and Journals, HARV. L. SCH. LIBRARY, http://guides.
library.harvard.edu/c.php?g=309907&p=2070141 (last updated Dec. 8, 2015).

66.

See, e.g., David Lat, America’s Next Top Law Review: New Rankings!, ABOVE THE L. (Feb. 24, 2014,
4:30 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/02/americas-next-top-law-review-new-rankings/;
Alicia Albertson, Best Law Reviews: Stanford Tops List, NAT’L JURIST (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.
nationaljurist.com/content/best-law-reviews-stanford-tops-list.

67.

Jason P. Nance & Dylan J. Steinberg, The Law Review Article Selection Process: Results from a National
Study, 71 ALB. L. REV. 565, 585 (2008).

68.

A grading system seems preferable to a system that ranks journals. Under a grading system,
each journal would earn a grade (e.g., excellent, good, fair, poor) that corresponds to a
transparent set of requirements.

69.

The boards of the AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION (ALEA), HTTP://WWW.
AMLECON.ORG/ALEA-OFFICERS.HTML (last visited July 27, 2016) and the SOCIETY FOR EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUDIES (SELS), HTTP://WWW.LAWSCHOOL.CORNELL.EDU/SELS/ABOUT.CFM (last
visited July 27, 2016), for example, always include several members with formal training in
empirical methods who have published empirical studies in peer-reviewed journals.
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nonoﬃcers is light.70 Serving as a board member likely would remain attractive
if, during each year of service, members were required to review some number
of empirical studies published in law reviews.71 To maintain continuity, the
boards could create standing committees, the chairs of which could work
together to coordinate and edit online publications of published article reviews
and to determine and widely publicize annual journal grades.72
Post-publication reviews would serve at least two purposes. First, they would
act as a quality check on published work. Academics, law students, lawyers,
judges, and other policymakers would have access to the entire set of reviews
and the study author’s response to the reviews, if any.73 The reviews would
assist readers who are unable to assess the quality of studies on their own.
Second, the reviews would act as a teaching tool for both student editors and
those aiming to sharpen their understanding of empirical methods, including
authors of future studies. The reviews could be used to generate a catalog of the
70.

I have served as a nonoﬃcer on both the ALEA and SELS boards, and this has been my
experience.

71.

We might worry about the willingness of law professors to engage in this time-consuming
process. The South Carolina Law Review experimented with peer review and reported that
most law professors who were asked to review submissions were willing to complete timely
reviews. See John P. Zimmer & Jason P. Luther, Peer Review as an Aid to Article Selection in StudentEdited Legal Journals, 60 S.C. L. REV. 959, 969-972 (2009). In addition, most if not all methods
experts are involved in the review systems of peer-reviewed journals. Peer review will not be
new to them, although public posting of reviews will be.
Even if a substantial number of volunteers step forward, we might worry about capacity
given the number of empirical studies published in student-edited journals. To roughly
estimate the number of empirical studies published by student-edited law journals, I
searched Lexis Advance’s Law Reviews and Journals database using the terms “Table 1” and
“statistical signiﬁcance” and publication (“law journal” or “law review”) for publication
between Jan. 1, 2006 and Dec. 1, 2015. LEXIS ADVANCE RES., HTTPS://ADVANCE.LEXIS.COM
(last visited July 30, 2016). Washington and Lee’s website allows the compilation of lists
of student-edited journals and peer-edited or refereed journals. Law Journals: Submission and
Ranking, 2008-2015, WASH. & LEE. SCH. L. L. LIBRARY, http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/ (last visited
July 27, 2016). A quick review of the lists suggests that student-edited journals are much
more likely to contain “law review” or “law journal” in their title relative to peer-edited
or referred journals. Lexis counts 678 articles published during the period 2006-2015, an
average of sixty-eight articles per year (the distribution is roughly uniform across the years).
LEXIS ADVANCE RES., supra. The same search over publication years 2011-2015 produces 379
hits, an average of seventy-six articles per year. Id. To the extent reviewing only a portion
of published articles is feasible, society committees could limit reviews to studies published
in main journals, studies published in journals with the highest impact according to the
Washington and Lee ranking, or a random selection of articles published in all studentedited journals.

72.

A grading system likely will be most eﬀective the more widely publicized it is. Eﬀorts could
be made to get annual grade reports into the hands of the law journal editorial boards,
law school administrators, law school rank and tenure committees, judges, and other
policymakers.

73.

Authors would have an opportunity to issue a written response. The academic society
committees would edit and publish the responses along with the reviews. While implementing
a double-blind system would be impossible because the reviewer would know the author of
the published study, reviewers could remain anonymous.
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most common errors that study authors might adopt as a checklist to reduce
the likelihood of such errors in their own work. Eventually such a checklist
might be used to generate a handbook that the committees could distribute to
incoming editorial boards through the school’s expert faculty liaison.74
Once the post-publication review process gets underway, assigning grades
to student-edited law journals would be fairly straightforward. Grades would
be based on a combination of the quality of published empirical studies,75 the
quality of any pre-publication peer-review process the journal employs, and
the journal’s data and procedure disclosure policy and its implementation.76
Grade assignment would be transparent, and the society committees would
update them annually.77
If the grading system is perceived as legitimate, it could work to
motivate student editorial boards to take better care in selecting and editing
empirical studies.78 It might also justify intervention by faculty or law school
administrators despite the strong norm of student editor independence.
Empirical scholars might be compelled to submit articles only to the topranked journals to bolster their reputations and to signal the quality of their
work to those unable to independently assess quality.79 In addition, if authors
believe that readers evaluate articles at least in part based on journal ranking,
authors might lean toward submitting only to highly ranked journals to
increase the potential impact of the study.
74.

Such a handbook might also include guidance on construction of tables and ﬁgures and
standards for database citation, publication, and access that track the guidelines promoted
by Data Access & Research Transparency. See TOP (Transparency and Openness Promotion)
Guidelines, DATA ACCESS & RES. TRANSPARENCY, http://www.dartstatement.org/#!2015-costop-guidelines/kyeo4 (last visited July 30, 2016).

75.

Reviewers could be asked to evaluate each study along some number of dimensions using
Likert scales, and the scores could be used (carefully) to assess the overall quality of studies
published by each journal. The reviewers could be directed to focus on objective measures
of quality related to the sorts of basic issues noted supra, note 30 and accompanying text. If
the idea of posting public critiques is disfavored, evaluations of published studies could be
used solely in the determination of journal grades. The downsides are the lost opportunity
to educate students and authors on the proper use of methods and the lost strong incentive
for authors to ensure quality to avoid negative public evaluations.

76.

The societies might oﬀer journals advice on data and procedure disclosure policies and how
to implement them, following the lead of organizations such as DA-RT.

77.

The society committees might explore the possibility of incorporating the grades into
Washington and Lee’s ranking system.

78.

While transferring the functions of selection and editing from student editors to methods
experts would be optimal, I’m pessimistic about law school administrators agreeing to go
along with this sort of radical change.

79.

Michele Landis Dauber oﬀered a similar prediction related to a movement toward peer
review. Dauber, supra note 30, at 1914 n.69 (“Status diﬀerentiation among law journals in
favor of those which are peer reviewed would provide in law, as in other disciplines, a way
to diﬀerentiate the quality of scholarship published in the ﬁeld by the locus of publication,
thus conferring reputational beneﬁts on scholars who chose to submit their work to the
rigors of peer review.”).
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To the extent that public post-publication reviews compel student editors
to seek pre-publication peer reviews, the academic society committees could
help streamline the process. Given that authors simultaneously submit to
potentially hundreds of law reviews, duplication of eﬀort could be vastly
reduced if student editors ﬁltered requests for reviews through the society
committees. Once a journal requests peer review of a submitted study, the
committees would log it, and all student editors would have access to the peer
reviews produced for the ﬁrst requester.80 If upon receipt of the peer reviews
the editorial board decides to issue an oﬀer for publication conditional on
implementation of changes recommended by the reviews, the editors would
have the option of submitting a revised version to the reviewers for approval.
Editors might indicate in the publication that the article was peer-reviewed
and approved.
It’s possible that students will resist the peer-review process given that it
will substantially slow down the acceptance process. On a positive note, a few
of the top main law journals now ask authors for exclusive submission for a
period of time to allow a review.81 Even if journals decide not to slow down
the process, all hope might not be lost if authors who wish to avoid critical
post-publication reviews are motivated to submit only high-quality studies.
Some might decide to limit themselves to producing only nonempirical
studies. Others might decide to team up with a methods expert and jointly
conduct empirical studies.82 The society committees might also implement a
pre-submission peer-review process. Authors could submit completed drafts,
and the society committees could facilitate a review and approval process
similar to the process for journal editors.83 If reviewers decide the study is
80.

These reviews would not be posted publicly, and the committees might request that student
editors keep them private and encourage the author to include mention of peer review in the
study’s initial footnote. Societies might ask their relevant board members to agree to peerreview some number of submissions each year and to submit them on a timely basis.

81.

As of June 2016, websites for three of the top main law reviews (as described in footnote 57,
supra) request that authors submit exclusively to that journal for at least a period of ten days.
Harvard and Stanford “strongly recommend” authors submit exclusively to the respective
journal for at least ten days, while Yale recommends submitting exclusively for at least two
weeks. See Harvard Submissions, supra note 57; Stanford Submissions, supra note 57. None of the other
top law reviews (Columbia, University of Chicago, NYU, Penn, UC Berkeley, Michigan,
UVA, Duke, Northwestern, Cornell, Georgetown, Texas (Austin), Vanderbilt, Washington
(St. Louis), USC, Boston University, Iowa, Minnesota, Fordham, Notre Dame, UCLA)
discusses exclusivity in its online submission guides.

82.

The society committees might consider implementing some sort of system that would help
nonexperts ﬁnd experts with compatible subject interests and an interest in considering
co-authorships.

83.

The number of reviews the system can produce is, of course, limited by the number of
volunteers willing to conduct reviews. If an insuﬃcient number of volunteers come forward,
only some studies will get through the review process, and top student-edited law journals
will compete for those studies. This might make it diﬃcult for other journals to improve
their grades. These journals, however, will have options beyond publishing empirical studies
of questionable quality. They can choose not to publish empirical studies. Alternatively,
they might seek out alternative ways to obtain expert reviews such as requesting them
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methodologically sound, the committees would post the approved draft on a
webpage administered by the societies. The author could then point student
editors to the webpage to verify that the societies approved the submitted
draft, and the author could note this in the study’s initial footnote.84
The society committees also might oﬀer ongoing assistance to student editors
by recruiting at least one faculty member at each law school with expertise in
empirical methods (if any) to serve as a liaison between the school’s editorial
boards and the society committees. Those expert faculty members might meet
with (or, at a minimum, communicate with) incoming board members to
caution them on the diﬃculties inherent in assessing the quality of empirical
submissions and provide editors with a list of potential peer reviewers broken
down by substantive area and inform them of the services provided by the
society committees.
Conclusion
In singing the praises of empirical legal scholarship Professors McAdams
and Ulen write, “[E]mpirical and experimental methods have already
contributed a great deal to legal scholarship, [and] . . . there is a good deal more
that those methods could contribute to the scholarly understanding of the law.
. . .”85 I wholeheartedly agree with this sentiment. They go on, however, to
note that “the techniques necessary to become adept at these methods are not
so daunting that legal scholars should be hesitant to make them a routine part
of their toolkits.”86 This characterization of what’s required to conduct sound
empirical work might have led us down a primrose path. While it is certainly
not impossible for inexpert scholars to get up to speed, a short summer course
might do more harm than good. Unfortunately, these courses provide training
that allows for the production of results using empirical models that are
diﬃcult to master in just a handful of days.
The current crises plaguing psychology, economics and other scientiﬁc ﬁelds
certainly illustrate that peer review is insuﬃcient to guarantee high quality.
The ﬁeld of empirical legal studies, however, is facing much more basic quality
issues. We should consider joining other scientiﬁc ﬁelds in eﬀorts to increase
the quality of published work, for the sake of the scientiﬁc endeavor and the
from capable members of their faculties or from capable members of their schools’ other
departments.
84.

Another option is to use a badge system similar to one the Association for Psychological
Science adopted in 2014. See Open Practices, ASS’N FOR PSYCHOL. SCI., http://www.
psychologicalscience.org/index.php/publications/journals/psychological_science/badges
(last visited July 27, 2016). Journals could award badges to studies approved after peer
review. The society committees might consider working with the editors of The Bluebook
to recommend or require a more general badge system to recognize compliance with best
practices, such as peer review, data and procedure disclosure, and publication of data to an
existing repository such as The Dataverse Project.

85.

Richard H. McAdams & Thomas S. Ulen, Introduction, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 791, 792.

86.

Id.
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promise of better policymaking. Although many past suggestions have either
fallen ﬂat or potentially exacerbated the problem, reforms that appeal to the
interests of editors and authors (and, one hopes, the experts) might motivate
reform.
The suggestions included here are merely that—ideas about how we might
capitalize on the interests of involved actors to generate incentives for change.
Myriad methods for tapping into relevant actors’ interests exist. The main
point of this essay is that passive suggestions haven’t worked and likely won’t
work to eﬀect change. We need something more. Implementation of some
or all of the suggestions on a grand scale might be impossible, at least at the
start. The hope is that the basic framework acts as a starting point for getting
some institutional changes underway. What is certain, however, is that change
will require sustained eﬀort by experts. This essay is a call to empirical legal
scholars and to academic societies to work together to heighten the standards
of published empirical scholarship and to join the ranks in other ﬁelds who are
working toward the same goal.

